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Abstract:
This article is devoted to the analysis of some decisions of the Constitutional 
Courts of Lithuania and of the Republic of Moldova, which, according to the 
author of this article, are indicative of a “constitutional unison”, as the courts, in 
dealing with similar issues, delivered comparable judgments at times knowing 
that similar decisions have been rendered by the other court and, at times, pos-
sibly, without being fully aware of the existence of similar rationales by the other 
court, since certain of the aforementioned decisions are separated by more than 
a decade. The reasons determining this unison, its consistency as well as other 
issues represent the object of the present research, which, due to its limited 
scope, can be considered a lead-in to a broader analysis of these matters.
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Streszczenie:
Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie niektórych wyroków Litewskich i Mołdawskich Try-
bunałów Konstytucyjnych, które zdaniem autora niniejszego artykułu, wskazują na 
“konstytucyjną jednomyślność”, ponieważ sądy w czasie rozpatrywania podob-
nych spraw wydały porównywalne wyroki. Niekiedy wiedząc, że podobne orze-
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Reasons determining the similarity 
of some decisions in constitutional 
jurisprudences. 
At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of 
the 21st century, after regaining their statehood or 
restoring the democratic setup of the state and its 
consolidation in their newly adopted constitutions, 
Eastern and Central European states witnessed 
the spread of constitutional review, and therefore 
cooperation between constitutional justice institu-
tions became indispensable. Starting their activity 
as novices and lacking appropriate experience, 
newly established constitutional courts studied 
the case law of the already established constitu-
tional control institutions, looked at and learned 
from the activity and decisions of each other, es-
pecially due to the fact that some issues related to 
the development of statehood were common; in 
dealing with these issues, the experience of other 
constitutional courts served as a particularly valu-
able additional source of constitutional law. One of 
the earliest judgments of the Constitutional Court 
of Hungary1 concerning the constitutionality of the 
1Decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary no. 23/1990 (X. 
31.) on the abolition of death penalty   (http://www.mkab.hu/letol-
tesek/en_ 0023_1990.pdf)
death penalty, irrespective of the fact that it drew 
certain criticism due to its argumentation2, became 
a model for other constitutional courts, such as 
the Lithuanian Constitutional Court3 or South Af-
rican Constitutional Court,4 in rendering their deci-
sions on the non-compliance of the death penalty 
with constitutional provisions. 
Up to now cooperation among constitutional 
courts has gained important institutional dimen-
sions. In the realm of international cooperation 
involving various constitutional courts, a sig-
nificant role is played by the Venice Commission 
(European Commission for Democracy through 
Law) which promotes cooperation among con-
stitutional courts and similar institutions. Such 
overwhelming international organisations as the 
World Conference on Constitutional Justice, the 
2The criticism of the arguments of the judgment of the Constitu-
tional Court of Hungary  was not against the ruling itself, it dis-
cusses the way of constitutional interpretation. Se: Janos Kis, 
Constitutional Democracy, CEU Press. Budapest, New York. 
2003, p. 253-259. Gábor Attila Tóth, Túl a szövegen: Értekezés a 
magyar alkotmányról (Beyond the Text: A Treatise on the Consti-
tution), Osiris, Budapest, 2009, pp 51-53.
3The ruling of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania of 9 December 
1998. Online access: www.lrkt.lt
4S. v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; (Judg-
ment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa of June 6, 1995).
czenia zostały wydane przez inne sądy, a czasem, być może, nie będąc w pełni 
świadomym istnienia podobnych orzeczeń wydanych przez inne sądy, ponieważ 
niektóre z wyżej wymienionych wyroków dzieli więcej niż dekada. Powody deter-
minujące tą jednomyślność, spójności, a także inne kwestie stanowią przedmiot 
niniejszego badania, które ze względu na ograniczony zakres, mogą być uznane 
za wprowadzenie do szerszej analizy. 
Słowa kluczowe: 
Trybunał Konstytucyjny, interpretacja konstytucyjna, forma rządzenia, orzecz-
nictwo konstytucyjne, konflikty konstytucyjne
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European Conference of European Constitutional 
Courts, the Association of Constitutional Justice 
of the Baltic and Black Sea Regions and other 
organisations were formed which are devoted to 
the examination  of the activity of constitutional 
courts and of the decisions adopted thereby. 
If we leaf the pages of the constitutions of 
democratic states, we will find a great deal of 
commonness; this is determined by the es-
sence of democratic states, founded on re-
spect for human rights, as consolidated in 
their respective provisions, and by the consti-
tutional principles of establishment, separation 
and balancing of the branches of state power. 
The principles enshrined in constitutions with 
regard to the establishment of constitutional 
control institutions, their competences and 
functioning also have plenty in common. Since 
constitutional law provides the rules to formu-
late the key legal principles that are universally 
understood and recognised in democratic 
states, such as rule of law, separation of state 
powers, independence of courts and other 
principles, their interpretation in constitutional 
jurisprudences unavoidably entails doctrinal 
similarity, or even uniformity. In scholarly con-
stitutional doctrine,5 similarity in judicial deci-
sions or in constitutional doctrines is identified 
as legal borrowing, constitutional implanting, 
etc. Despite the existing differences in their 
5See :  Vlad Perju. Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing and 
Migrations, in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional 
Law, M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajo (ed), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012, p. 1304-1327.
denomination, at the core of this phenomenon 
lies the aim to make use of the case law for-
mulated by another court in cases requiring 
the resolving of complicated constitutional re-
view issues. The area of constitutional rights 
features even greater commonness  resulting 
from the law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the 
Convention law) and the activity of and prec-
edents formulated by the European Court of 
Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the 
ECtHR). The globalisation of law, unification of 
different fields of law, influence of international 
treaties and EU law, including the activity of 
the ECtHR, determine the courts, when faced 
with similar constitutional review matters, to 
deliver the corresponding decisions. This is 
evident not only in relation to the ordinary law. 
Precedents formulated by the ECtHR bear par-
ticular significance; it is not a rare occurrence 
that they determine a situation where the deci-
sions of constitutional courts are based on the 
principles elaborated by the ECtHR and, thus, 
inevitably lead to the proximity or similarity of 
jurisprudences.6 However, the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation makes it possible for 
the individuality of national constitutional law 
to find its expression even in such decisions. 
6The influence of Convention law and EU law on the constitutional 
jurisprudence is widely analyzed in general  and national reports 
of the XVIth  Congress of the  European Constitutional Courts. 
See: C. Grabenwater The co-operation of Constitutional Courts in 
Europe – Current Situation and Perspectives. General report and 
Outline of main Issues. XVI th Congress of the Conference of Eu-
ropean Constitutional Courts. The Cooperation of Constitutional 
Courts in Europe,  Volume I, Verlag Osterreich, 2014, p. 35-62. 
Cooperation among constitutional courts has gained 
important institutional dimensions.
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Constitutional courts deal not only with purely 
legal but also with legal-political issues. The 
constitutional setup of states does not avoid 
certain specificity that is characteristic to par-
ticular states or small groups or states. Thus, for 
instance, any typology of forms of government 
in the states inevitably contains exceptions that 
are typical to a particular state or several particu-
lar states. Nevertheless, even in this area, deci-
sions adopted by courts demonstrate a certain 
degree of similarity. What are the reasons be-
hind this? Is this phenomenon determined by an 
analogous legal or, at times, political situation, or 
by the decision of the courts to follow the juris-
prudence of another constitutional jurisdiction 
instance, thereby creating the preconditions for 
the development of international constitutional 
legal precedents. The question is  whether con-
stitutional courts, when being aware of the exist-
ing precedents, should follow these precedents 
and leave themselves a broad margin of appre-
ciation, or whether, to the contrary, constitutional 
jurisprudence allows no such precedents, since 
the constitution and constitution law form the 
core of national law and define the foundations 
of state sovereignty; therefore, the constitutional 
control institution must exclusively draw on the 
explicit and implicit principles consolidated in the 
constitution and invoke all other legal sources, 
including international, solely as a source of in-
spiration or a supplementary source substanti-
ating the specific line of reasoning taken by the 
court. However, such a conservative approach, 
first and foremost, can be repudiated in view of 
the above-mentioned influence of the Conven-
tion law on constitutional jurisprudences; in addi-
tion, this approach does not square with the fact 
that the area of constitutional rights in the states 
founded on the principles of the rule of law and 
respect for human rights has seen the forma-
tion of common uniform criteria for human rights 
protection and, especially, the protection of the 
scope of their implementation; ultimately, the 
principles inspired by the Convention law, which 
overlap with the criteria entrenched in the consti-
tutions, are understood as universal and uniform, 
and precedents developed by the ECtHR are re-
garded as sources of national constitutional law. 
The jurisprudential cooperation of constitutional 
courts assumes various forms. It is rather com-
mon that courts themselves indicate that, in 
deciding one or another issue, they drew on the 
specific decision or precedent worked out by an-
other court.7 But, at times, a nearly analogous de-
cision is reached without actual awareness of the 
existing corresponding jurisprudence of another 
court, in particular, when such decisions are sep-
arated by a long period of time – more than a 
decade. This type of unison in the jurisprudence 
of constitutional courts finds its manifestation in 
some decisions handed down by the Lithuanian 
and Moldovan Constitutional Courts.
Particularities related to forms 
of state government. The 
constitutional powers of the 
President of the state in the 
formation of the Government. 
The ruling of the Constitutional Court of Lithu-
ania of 10 January 1998 and the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova 
of 29 December 2015, which can be viewed as 
examples of constitutional unison, were adopted 
with a difference in time of more than a decade; 
however, they share considerable proximity with 
regard to the questions they dealt with while an-
swering which form of government of the state 
7F.e. In the  ruling of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania of 
28 September 2011 ( On the State  Family Concept) examples 
of jurisprudence of constitutional courts of  Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Federal Republic of Germania, 
Constitutional Council of France are analyzed.  
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is underpinned by the constitutional provisions 
and what constitutional powers are conferred on 
the President of the state in forming the Govern-
ment and nominating a candidate for the office 
of Prime Minister. Although the powers of the 
President in forming the Government and decid-
ing on a candidate for the office of Prime Minister 
to be approved by the Parliament in democratic 
states are generally regulated under specific 
constitutional provisions, these powers are often 
determined in parallel by certain constitutional 
conventions, and this is particularly the case in 
common law systems. Such  constitutional con-
ventions are very important in establishing the 
balance between state powers  and they are 
serving in avoiding constitutional conflicts. Thus, 
for instance, French constitutional doctrine dic-
tates certain rules in this respect.8 However, in the 
absence of such conventions, or in the event of 
disagreements between the politicians, interpre-
tation of constitutional provisions by the consti-
tutional control institution becomes unavoidable. 
Usually, this situation occurs where the alteration 
of constitutional provisions is complicated and 
8The keystone principle of democratic states is that the Govern-
ment must express the will of political majority of the Parliament. 
The President of France has never appointed someone else then 
the candidate proposed by parliamentary majority, even in cases 
when it was forged by his adversaries or in spite of the presidential 
party being represented by most MPs, and the parliamentary major-
ity was formed by two smaller parties. This happened three times 
in the last 30 years, the most famous case being in 1986, when the 
socialist François Mitterrand appointed as Prime Minister his adver-
sary Jacques Chirac (and later also appointed Eduard Balladur, and 
some years later the President Chirac appointed as Prime Minister 
the socialist Lionel Jospin). Such practice is regulated by interpretive 
constitutional convention. 
the solution of the matter is placed before the 
constitutional court. 
The capability of the constitution to provide for 
all possible circumstances or to envisage all 
possible twists and turns in the interrelation-
ship of state powers is disputable. The consti-
tution is an act of constituent power, grounded 
on the experience of the past but designated to 
influence, in an effective way, the future of the 
state. Thus, it is doubtful whether the constitu-
tion is capable to envisage all vicissitudes in 
relations between the branches of state power. 
In cases of disagreements between state au-
thority institutions, a reasonable question aris-
es whether an amendment to the constitution 
is necessary in all these cases, or whether the 
same effect can be achieved by the constitu-
tional control institution by means of interpret-
ing the provisions of the constitution.
In certain cases, the interpretation of the pro-
visions of the constitution in the acts of the 
constitutional court not only makes it possi-
ble to avoid the arising conflicts, it also gives 
guidelines for further cooperation between 
state authority institutions. Such successful 
cases can be considered to include the ruling 
of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania of 10 
January 19989: it formulated the doctrine upon 
which the relations of the executive power (the 
9The ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania 
of 10 January1998. Online access: www.lrkt.lt.
Unison in the jurisprudence of constitutional courts finds 
its manifestation in some decisions handed down by the 
Lithuanian and Moldovan Constitutional Courts.
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President and the Government) have been 
based since then, and provided the answer to 
the question as to the form of government of 
the state, which is implicitly consolidated in the 
provisions of the Constitution. 
Conflicts between presidents and prime min-
isters over appointment related issues are not 
rear in the countries that adopted new consti-
tutions and constructed principles of govern-
ess based on separation of powers.10 In Lithu-
ania, following the election of the President, 
the conflict between the Prime Minister and the 
President concerning the powers of the Presi-
dent (and the Parliament) in the appointment 
and release of the Prime Minister (and the Gov-
ernment) from office resulted in constitutional 
dispute and, consequently, led to the adoption 
of the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 10 
January 1998. Upon interpreting the provisions 
of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
held that the form of government in Lithuania 
is a parliamentary republic with certain ele-
ments characteristic of a semi-presidential re-
public. In this ruling, the Constitutional Court 
clarified that, based on the competence of 
state institutions as established by the Consti-
tution, the model of government of the State 
of Lithuania should be categorised as the form 
of parliamentary republic. At the same time, 
the Constitutional Court noted that the form of 
government of the State of Lithuania also has 
certain characteristics of the so-called mixed 
(semi-presidential) form of government. This 
is reflected in the powers of the Parliament 
(Seimas), the powers of the Head of State – 
the President of the Republic, and the powers 
of the Government, as well as in the legal ar-
10 See:  G. A. Toth. From Uneasy Compromises to Democratic 
Partnership. The Prospects of Central European Constitutional-
ism ?, “European Journal of Law Reform” 2011 (13)1, p.80-96; 
p. 84-85.
rangement of their reciprocal interaction. The 
President is elected in direct elections. The 
Lithuanian constitutional system consolidates 
the principle of the responsibility of the Gov-
ernment to the Seimas, which determines the 
manner of the formation of the Government; 
the constitutional framework of the branches 
of state power entails that only the Govern-
ment that has the confidence of the Seimas 
may accomplish its powers based on the prin-
ciples of parliamentary democracy, which are 
consolidated in the Constitution.
In the above-mentioned ruling, the Consti-
tutional Court interpreted the constitutional 
competences of the President in relation to 
the appointment of the Prime Minister (and the 
Government)11 to the effect that the President of 
the Republic cannot freely choose candidates 
for the office of Prime Minister or ministers, 
since the appointment of these officials is in all 
cases dependent on whether the Seimas (Par-
liament) has confidence in or distrust of them. 
The Constitutional Court also stressed that the 
fact that the President of the Republic, as part of 
executive power, has some political possibilities 
of influencing the formation of the structure of 
the Government should not be ignored, either. It 
11In the ruling of 10 January1998, the Constitutional Court anal-
ysed the relations between the President of the Republic and the 
Government and stressed that they are regulated by the norms 
of the Constitution. Under the Constitution, upon the approval 
of the Seimas, the President of the Republic appoints the Prime 
Minister, charges him/her with forming the Government, and ap-
proves the composition of the Government; upon the approval of 
the Seimas, the President removes the Prime Minister from office; 
accepts the powers returned by the Government upon the elec-
tion of a new Seimas and charges the Government with exercis-
ing its functions until a new Government is formed; accepts the 
resignation of the Government and, when necessary, charges it 
with continuing to exercise its functions or charges one of the 
Ministers with exercising the functions of the Prime Minister until 
a new Government is formed; the President of the Republic, upon 
the resignation of the Government or after it returns its powers, 
within 15 days, proposes a candidate for the office of Prime Min-
ister for consideration by the Seimas, etc.
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should be mentioned that the argumentation in 
the ruling contains, among others, references to 
French constitutional case law.12
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Moldova, in its judgment of 29 December 
2015,13 faced analogous issues concerning 
the form of government of the state, implied 
by constitutional provisions, and the constitu-
tional powers granted by these provisions to 
the President of the state in forming the Gov-
ernment and in cases of choosing a candidate 
for the office of Prime Minister for a new Gov-
ernment.14 Regardless of a decade-long pe-
riod separating these decisions, their lines of 
argumentation share a great deal of similarity; 
although the judgment of the Moldovan Con-
stitutional Court contains no direct reference 
to the ruling of the Lithuanian Constitutional 
Court of 10 January 1998, both these deci-
sions can be regarded as illustrating unison in 
constitutional doctrines.
12In the mentioned ruling, the Constitutional Court noted that 
the constitutional regulation of the returning of the powers of the 
Government after the election of the President of the Republic 
reminds, at least partly, of the constitutional tradition of the Third 
French Republic, when the Government there would resign after 
a parliamentary election and after a presidential election. The res-
ignation after a presidential election was called the “resignation of 
courtesy” (démission de courtoise). After the “resignation of cour-
tesy”, the Government had to be approved anew. This procedure 
is said to be meaningful due to the relation of the Government 
with the Head of State, and that it reflects certain tendencies in 
the development of the model of government of the state.
13Judgement of the Constitutional Court No.32 of 29.12.2015 on 
constitutional review of the Decree of the President of the Repub-
lic of Moldova No. 1877-VII of 21 December 2015 on appointing a 
candidate for the position of Prime-minister // http://www.const-
court.md/ccdocview.php?tip=hotariri&docid=553&l=ro
14The complaint addressed to the Constitutional Court of Moldova 
mainly concerned the conditions for performing the duties of the 
President of Moldova on designating a candidate for the office of 
Prime Minister and referred to a set of interlinked constitutional 
principles, such as democracy, representative mandate and re-
lationships between the Parliament and the President of the Re-
public while appointing the Prime Minister.
In the judgment at issue, the Constitutional 
Court of Moldova widely analysed the consti-
tutional grounds for the constitutional obliga-
tion of the President of the Republic of Mol-
dova in designating a candidate for the office 
of Prime Minister. The Constitutional Court 
examined the constitutional arrangements of 
France, the USA, Germany, Italy, the Czechia 
and other countries. The Constitutional Court 
emphasised that, in no parliamentary republic, 
the President elected by the parliamentary ma-
jority is entitled to dissolve the Parliament for 
the reason that the absolute majority of mem-
bers of the Parliament did not accept his/her 
candidate for the office of Prime Minister.
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Moldova held that the relevant constitutional 
provisions (Article 98.1 of the Constitution) 
should be interpreted taking into account the 
parliamentary form of government of the Re-
public of Moldova. The Court found that the 
constitutional provisions (Article 98.1 of the 
Constitution) provide for the exclusive pre-
rogative of the President of the Republic to 
designate a candidate for the office of Prime 
Minister. At the same time, the Court noted 
that, although it is exclusive, the designation 
prerogative cannot be discretionary, since the 
President may designate a candidate for the 
office of Prime Minister only following consul-
tations with parliamentary factions. The es-
sential element of the procedure of forming the 
Government is the vote of the Parliament; the 
Government will only be politically responsible 
before the Parliament, which can dismiss it.
Following this reasoning and taking into ac-
count the principles set out in its case law, the 
Moldovan Constitutional Court held that, in or-
der to secure his constitutional powers to pro-
pose a candidate for the office of Prime Minis-
Pol Law Rev, 2016 Vol. 2 (2), p. 47-59
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 
DOI: 10.5604/24509841.1230279
Unison in Constitutional Interpretation...
54
ter, the President of the Republic, elected by a 
parliamentary majority,15 must ensure, through 
consultations with parliamentary factions, both 
the support of the parliamentary majority and 
the possible constructive cooperation with the 
minority, which is in the opposition.
The Constitutional Court appreciated the inter-
pretation according to which the discretionary 
right of the President to designate a candidate 
for the office of Prime Minister as legally il-
logical. At the same time, the President can-
not be denied the right to assess the character, 
competences, experience and, ultimately, the 
ability of a person, either politically involved or 
not, to lead the Government and to attract the 
political support of the parliamentary majority, 
which will support him/her for the tenure of the 
legislature, but has no constitutional support to 
impose their own candidate.
In the event of the formation of the Govern-
ment as a result of parliamentary elections, the 
President cannot but recognise the outcome of 
the popular vote, the designation being carried 
out as follows: the President takes note of the 
official results of the elections and entrusts the 
mandate to form the Government to a person 
who has been proposed by an absolute majori-
ty in the Parliament. Therefore, either a majority 
of political forces in the Parliament is formed or 
the Parliament is dissolved and early elections 
are conducted.
The Constitutional Court came to the conclu-
sion that, in the event of an absolute parlia-
mentary majority being forged, the President of 
15In the period of the adoption of the judgment of 29 December 
2015, following the constitutional reform of 2000 and until March 
2016, under the provisions of the Article 78 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Moldova of 1994, the President had to be elected 
by the parliamentary majority.
the Republic must designate a candidate sup-
ported by this majority; and only when there is 
no absolute parliamentary majority forged, the 
President of the Republic of Moldova is under 
the duty, following consultation with parlia-
mentary factions, to designate a candidate for 
the office of Prime Minister, even if parliamen-
tary factions do not agree with the proposal of 
the President.
The constitutional doctrine formulated in this 
judgment regarding the powers of the Presi-
dent of the Republic to designate a candidate 
for the office of Prime Minister to be approved 
by the Parliament in cases of forming a new 
Government can also be applied to the forma-
tion of the Government following parliamentary 
elections, as well as where a new Government 
is formed following the resignation of the Gov-
ernment or after a motion of no confidence is 
voted by the Parliament. 
In considering the constitutional doctrine that 
was formulated in the judgment of 29 Decem-
ber 2015 regarding the powers of the President 
of the Republic to propose a candidate for the 
office of Prime Minister to be approved by the 
Parliament, it is also important to analyse the 
doctrine developed by the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Moldova in its judgment of 22 
April 201316 regarding the powers of the Presi-
dent of the Republic to appoint an acting Prime 
Minister. In this judgment, the Court considered 
the issue concerning the appointment of the 
16Judgment No. 4 of 22 April 2013 on constitutional review of the 
Decrees of the President of the Republic of Moldova No. 534-
VII of 8 March 2013 on the dismissal of the Government, in the 
part concerning staying in office of the Prime Minister dismissed 
by a motion of no confidence (on suspicion of corruption) of 8 
March 2013 until the formation of the new government, and No. 
584-VII of 10 April 2013 on the nomination of a candidate for the 
office of Prime Minister // http://www.constcourt.md/ccdocview.
php?tip=hotariri&docid=443&l=en
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ad interim Prime Minister upon the resignation 
of the Government in the Parliament following 
a motion of no confidence on the grounds of 
suspected involvement of its members in cor-
ruption. In the judgment at issue, the Constitu-
tional Court interpreted the provisions of Article 
101(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Moldova. When formulating the doctrine in rela-
tion to the appointment of the ad interim Prime 
Minister, the Constitutional Court pointed out 
that, in the event of the resignation of the Gov-
ernment upon the expression  of no confidence 
on the grounds of the suspicion of corruption, 
the President of the Republic may not appoint 
for the office of Prime Minister on a temporary 
basis the Prime Minister of the Government that 
has been dismissed on the said grounds of sus-
pected corruption, and must appoint another 
member of the Government whose integrity has 
not been affected. In this case, the President is 
not obliged to consult parliamentary factions for 
the nomination of the ad interim Prime Minis-
ter. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Moldova also mentioned that nothing forbids 
the President to consult the opinion of parlia-
mentary fractions referring the selection of the 
member of the Government to be nominated as 
ad interim Prime Minister.
Thus, differently from the situation when a new 
Government is formed (following parliamen-
tary elections or for other reasons that led to 
the resignation or removal of the Government), 
in the event of temporary substitution for the 
Prime Minister, the President of the Repub-
lic has no duty to consult the parliamentary 
fractions and has the discretionary power to 
choose a member of the cabinet of ministers 
to act as ad interim Prime Minister. 
The constitutional doctrine formulated regard-
ing the powers of the President in the judg-
ment of 29 December 2015 should, first of all, 
be assessed in the context of the constitutional 
regulation of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Moldova that was in force at the time of the 
adoption of the said judgment, i.e. at the time 
when the President of the Republic, following 
the constitutional amendments of 2000, had to 
be elected in the Parliament. In its judgment of 
4 March 2016,17 the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Moldova ruled the constitutional 
amendments related to the modality of presi-
dential elections to have been in conflict with 
the Constitution; consequently, the previous 
constitutional provision that the President must 
be elected in direct elections was upheld.18
The constitutional amendments of 200019 
changed the system of election of the Presi-
dent from direct elections to elections by the 
legislature with the vote of 3/5 of its members. 
As a result, the amendments to the Constitu-
tion that anticipated a different and more com-
plicated system of the election of the President 
caused political instability.20 In its judgment of 
4 March 2016, the Constitutional Court, after 
examining the procedural and substantive ele-
17 Judgment No. 7 of 4 March 2016 on constitutional review of 
certain provisions of Law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000 amend-
ing the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (modality of 
electing the President) // http://www.constcourt.md/ccdocview.
php?tip=hotariri&docid=558&l=en
18Ibidem
19Law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000 on amending the Constitution 
of Moldova.
20After the 2009 parliamentary elections in Moldova, no party was 
able to form a majority and create a coalition needed to secure 61 
votes for the presidential candidate. Due to the fact that it was not 
possible to elect the President of the Republic, from 2009 until 
2012, these duties were exercised by acting Speakers of the Par-
liament, and early elections to the Parliament had to be held due 
to the fact failing to elect the President; as a consequence, the 
Parliament was dismissed. Mr. Timofti was elected the President 
of the Republic of Moldova only on 16 March 2012.
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ments, not only ascertained the failure to follow 
the procedure of the adoption of the amend-
ment to the Constitution but also emphasised, 
inter alia, that the challenged amendment of 
Article 78 generated a rapture of the consti-
tutional unity, as it failed to secure the normal 
functioning of the presidential institute and 
generated an imperfect system of government, 
and after examining different aspects of the 
constitutionality of the law amending the Con-
stitution, the Constitutional Court declared it to 
have been inconsistent with the Constitution. 
In this judgment, the Constitutional Court de-
scribed the situation that resulted after declar-
ing the amendment to the Constitution as un-
constitutional and stressed that the wording of 
Article 78 of the Constitution applicable prior to 
the entry into force of the challenged law must 
become applicable again, so the President of 
the Republic had to be elected by popular vote. 
Thus, in examining the relevance of the doc-
trine at issue, it is important to be aware of the 
analysed constitutional doctrine as formulated 
in the judgment of 29 December 2015 by the 
Moldovan Constitutional Court in relation to 
the powers of the President of the Republic 
in forming the Government, which was inter-
preted by taking account of the previous mo-
dality of presidential elections, as well as to be 
aware of how this doctrine squares with the 
currently existing, already changed, constitu-
tional setup, influenced by the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of Moldova of 4 March 
2016, by which, as mentioned before, certain 
amendments introduced in 2000 to the Con-
stitution of Moldova in relation to the modality 
of the election of the President of the Republic 
were ruled to have been unconstitutional. Ac-
cording to the provisions of Article 78 of the 
Constitution of Moldova of 1994 that are cur-
rently in force, the President of the Republic is 
elected not in the Parliament but in a general 
direct election. 
In the judgment of 29 December 2015, when 
interpreting the powers of the President to 
nominate a candidate for the office of Prime 
Minister to be approved by the Parliament, the 
Constitutional Court of Moldova underlined, as 
one of the main arguments, the procedure of 
election of the President of the Republic, which 
affects the content of presidential powers. It 
should be noted that, when the Constitution 
was amended in 2000, amendments affected 
not only the modality of election of the Presi-
dent but also the powers of the President.21 
The latter amendment was not dealt with in 
the judgment of 4 March 2016 (neither was this 
matter contested by the petitioners). In view of 
the aspects of the constitutional amendments 
of 2000, the assumption can be drawn that the 
Constitutional Court of Moldova possibly did 
not examine this matter due to the fact that 
the amendment concerning the powers of the 
President, which envisaged the narrowing of 
the powers of the President with respect to the 
Government, was reviewed in the conclusion 
of the Constitutional Court of 199922 assess-
ing the submitted draft amendments to the 
Constitution; the draft amendment concerning 
the above-mentioned aspect during the pro-
cess of adoption in the Parliament remained 
unchanged; therefore, the formal grounds for 
adopting such amendments to the Constitu-
21Law no. 1115 of 05.07.2000 on the amendment of the Consti-
tution of the Republic of Moldova;  Monitorul Oficial no. 88-90 
of 28.07.2000 // http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&-
view=doc&lang=1&id=311032
22Opinion of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Mol-
dova no. 6 of 16.11.1999 on the initiative to amend the Consti-
tution of the Republic of Moldova (Monitorul Oficial no.133-
134/73 of 02.12.1999)// http://www.constcourt.md/ccdocview.
php?tip=avize&docid=27&l=ro
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tion should not become an object of constitu-
tional dispute. 
In view of the modality of election of the Presi-
dent of the Republic in direct elections and 
taking account of the powers of the President 
under which the President had the discretional 
right to propose a candidate for the office of 
Prime Minister to be approved by the Parlia-
ment, as well as in view of certain powers of the 
President with respect to the Government, the 
Constitutional Court regarded the initial regu-
lation of constitutional setup as established in 
the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova of 
1994 as consolidating a semi-presidential re-
publican form of government and as not pre-
cluding the President from freely nominating a 
candidate to be approved by the Parliament for 
the office of Prime Minister.23
23In the judgment of 29 December 2015, the Constitutional Court 
of Moldova referred to its previous judgments and noted that, pri-
or to 5 July 2000, according to Article 78 of the Constitution, the 
President of the Republic of Moldova was elected by the citizens 
and, from the point of view of representation, this position was on 
a similar level as the position of the legislative authority, enjoying 
a wide range of competences. The President had the right to initi-
ate amendments to the Constitution (Article 141.1.c), to designate 
a candidate for the office of Prime Minister without consultation 
with parliamentary factions (Article 98.1), to take part in the sit-
tings of the Government, to chair the sittings of the Government 
he was attending, to consult the Government in matters of urgen-
cy or particular importance (Article 83 of the Constitution), etc.
Considering that, after the Constitutional 
Court had delivered the judgment of 4 March 
2016, in which certain amendments to the 
Constitution were declared in conflict with 
the Constitution, only the modality of elec-
tion of the President was changed and not 
the powers of the President, it is possible to 
draw the assumption that the doctrine devel-
oped in the judgment of 29 December 2015 
in relation to the powers of the President in 
nominating a candidate to be approved by 
the Parliament for the office of Prime Min-
ister will continue to be relevant. Since, as 
indicated by the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Moldova in the judgment of 
4 March 2016, the form of government of the 
Republic of Moldova remained unaffected by 
the changes in the modality of election of the 
President, i.e. the Republic of Moldova has 
remained a parliamentary republic.
By way of conclusion it can be noted that 
the forms of government of the Republic of 
Lithuania and of the Republic of Moldova 
have acquired certain additional common 
qualities. Under the Lithuanian and Moldo-
van constitutional regulations, the Presidents 
in both states are elected by universal suf-
frage, and their powers are not broad. Thus, 
In the absence of close cooperation between the courts 
themselves and their striving to exchange their experience 
in constitutional jurisprudence, the occurring similarities 
would constitute single isolated cases, not contributing to 
the development of constitutional precedents.
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the constitutional doctrine formulated by the 
Lithuanian Constitutional Court in its ruling of 
10 January 1998 can be considered relevant 
in assessing the constitutional framework 
of Moldova, its form of government and the 
powers conferred on the President of the Re-
public in forming the Government. In the light 
of the constitutional doctrine developed by 
the Lithuanian Constitutional Court in the rul-
ing of 10 January 1998, another assumption 
can be made that, upon the delivery of the 
judgment of 4 March 2016 by the Moldovan 
Constitutional Court, which led to changes 
in the modality of election of the President 
of the Republic, the form of government of 
the parliamentary Republic of Moldova has 
also gained certain elements of a semi-pres-
idential republic, as well as that the constitu-
tional doctrine formulated in the ruling of the 
Lithuanian Constitutional Court of 10 Janu-
ary 1998 can be regarded as pertinent in in-
terpreting the current constitutional setup of 
the Republic of Moldova. 
Unison of constitutional doctrines extends to 
certain other decisions adopted by the Lithu-
anian and Moldovan Constitutional Courts. It 
similarly becomes evident in analysing, inter 
alia, the ruling of the Lithuanian Constitutional 
Court of 24 January 201424 and the judgment 
of the Moldovan Constitutional Court of 4 
March 201625 concerning the constitutional-
ity of constitutional amendments; another set 
of decisions regards the reduction of social 
guarantees during the global economic cri-
24The ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithu-
ania of 24 January 2014. On line access: www.lrkt.lt
25Judgment No. 7 of 4 March 2016 on constitutional review of 
certain provisions of Law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000 amend-
ing the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (modality of 
electing the President) // http://www.constcourt.md/ccdocview.
php?tip=hotariri&docid=558&l=en
sis, inter alia, in the ruling of the Lithuanian 
Constitutional Court of 1 July 201326 and the 
judgments of the Moldovan Constitutional 
Court of 10 September 201327 and 6 Novem-
ber 201428etc. 
The proximity of constitutional doctrines is 
determined by various factors, including the 
development of statehood, shared features 
of the constitutional setup and similarities in 
political processes taking place in the states. 
Regardless of this, in the absence of close co-
operation between the courts themselves and 
their striving to exchange their experience in 
constitutional jurisprudence, the occurring 
similarities would constitute single isolated 
cases, not contributing to the development of 
constitutional precedents.  
26The ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithu-
ania of 1 July 2013. On line access: www.lrkt.lt
27Judgment of the Constitutional Court no. 24 of 09.10.2013 on 
the control of constitutionality of some provisions of Annex 2 
of the Law No. 48 of 22 March 2012 on the System of wages 
of public servants// http://www.constcourt.md/ccdocview.
php?tip=hotariri&docid=470&l=ro
28Judgment no.25 of 06.11.2014 on the control of constitutionality 
of certain provisions of Law no.146 of 17 July 2014 on the amend-
ment and competition of certain legislative acts (remuneration of 
public servants within courts and of judges)// http://www.const-
court.md/ccdocview.php?tip=hotariri&docid=514&l=ro
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